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NAVAJO CAMPAIGNS AND THE OCCUPATION OF
NEW MEXICO, 1847-1848

FRANK MCNIT!'

LATE WINTER 1846, the first new year of American occupation,
found the forces of Colonel Sterling Price weakened by scurvy
and thinly spread on two fronts. In the Rio Abajo two companies
of the 1St Dragoons, returning in late March to headquarters at Albuquerque from the insurrectionary battle of Taos pueblo, were
alerted frequently-but usually too late-to renewed attacks by Navajo. Assurances of Zarcillos Largos to the contrary, livestock raids
and murders increasingly hore evidence that Navajo warfare
against New Mexicans had not ceased.
In the four northern counties, but concentrated in San Miguel,
Price's Missourians faced an equally unpredictable foe: dissident
New Mexicans who by day were innocent citizens, but by night
rode as guerrilla raiders with the fugitive outlaw, Manuel Cortes.
A plotted revolt, ebbing at Christmas, swelled again with the murders on January 19, 1847, of Governor Bent and five others at Taos.
The revolt had been contained, but harassment and a continuing
threat of insurrection persisted. Some of the instigators were caught
and hanged. Others, like Tomas Ortiz and Diego Archuleta, vanished. A few, and of these Manuel Cortes was most conspicuous,
remained on to fight independently as guerrillas or occasionally to
join in raids with Indian allies-at least once with Cheyenne and
Apache-from the village of Mora to Anton Chico.
Early thaws of false spring boded worse to come. His effective
force now numbered not more than one thousand men, and at
least that number, Colonel Price believed, was needed for occupation duty in New Mexico. "The opinion that the New Mexicans
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are favorably inclined to the U. S. government is entirely erroneous," he reported. "The fate of Governor Bent and others may be
expected by every American in this Country, unless an over-awing
force be maintained here." Lack of forage near Santa Fe compelled
the dispersal of his Missouri Mounted Volunteers among distant
grazing camps, leaving only the dragoons and infantry for service
at Taos, Santa Fe, and Albuquerque, in order, as he put it, "to
restrain the Mexicans, and, at the same time, to prevent predatory
incursions on the part of the Navajo Indians, who of late have
been very troublesome."l
Navajo raids on Spanish livestock, however, commanded less
of Price's attention than the murderous attacks on his grazing
camps by allied New Mexican and Indian forces under Cortes.
This will-o'-the-wisp alliance, sometimes mounting in strength to
not less than four hundred of the foe, always caught the Missourians by surprise, the raiders evaporating like morning fog before
pursuit could be organized. Between May 20 and July 6 large numbers of horses and mules were run off, some sixty to seventy oxen
stolen from a wagon train were butchered, and the troops lost
Lieutenants Robert T. Brown and John Larkin together, with eight
men killed and fourteen wounded. In reprisal for the murder of
Lieutenant Brown, two privates, and a Mexican guide, Major Benjamin B. Edmonson descended upon a small village fifteen miles
south of Las Vegas, shot down a few of the inhabitants who attempted to escape, and took some forty others as prisoners to Santa
Fe. There, believing that a trial by a civil court "would be a mere
farce," Colonel Price ordered a drumhead court martial which
resulted in the hanging of six of the prisoners on August 3. 2
The expiration of the one-year volunteers' term of service in
June and July, with the consequent decimation of Price's command, coincided with new rumors of insurrection and reports that
a large Mexican army was gathering at Chihuahua for an assault
upon the American occupation force. Price was uncertain about
the credibility of the rumors but the reduction in numbers of the
2d Missouri Regiment was real enough for him to order the remainder of those troops to concentrate upon Santa Fe. He issued
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orders at the same time for the organization of four new companies
of volunteers, to be known as the Santa Fe Battalion. It was to be
comprised of teamsters formerly in the employ of the assistant
quartermaster-as rough and undisciplined a lot of men as could
be found west of the Missouri-and discharged volunteers of the
Missouri companies who could be prevailed upon to re-enlist. Any
fears that the Americans' hold on the territory might be broken
were dissipated by the middle of August. The mythical army of
Chihuahua failed to materialize, and although a considerable portion of the citizens continued to entertain a deadly hatred against
the Americans, as Price observed, rumors of revolt remained rumors
only. In part, the uneasy lull may have been due to the efficient
way in which the Santa Fe Battalion was quickly brought to full
strength of about four hundred men; in part, also, to word reaching
the capital that 2,500 fresh troops were on their way from Fort
Leavenworth and were expected to arrive before the end of the
month. 3 Remnants of the 2d Regiment, meanwhile, had been
ordered home to Missouri, and Colonel Price himself planned to
join them on temporary leave, timing his departure for August I 5.
During his absence Lieutenant Colonel Alton R. Easton of the
Missouri Infantry would assume command.
A YEAR'S TIME since the arrival of General Kearny with the first
American troops had brought modest changes in the appearance of
Santa Fe, although one's first impressions were apt to be much the
same: Narrow roads descending through sandy hills and pinon
scrub to a largely unshaded plain dotted singly and then in clusters
with low adobe buildings, only a few of them rising to two stories.
Except in the center of town the houses for the most part were
widely spaced, the fields between lying bare or planted in com or
beans, with gray fences of cedar posts, or occasionally an adobe
wall, running in long horizontal lines to separate one field from the
next. The prevailing color against the green slope of mountains
was pale tan to dark brown, depending on the light or time of day.
Transportation was by oxcart, burros, mules, or fewer horses, and
now and then, but rarely, by dusty ambulance wagon-denoting
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the passage of milItary officers or perhaps one of the not more
than half a dozen men high enough in civil government to afford
such luxury. Dead animals and offal that littered the streets a
year before, with a covering fog of evil stench, were now-by
order-removed. Some of the more conspicuous buildings that had
stood in crumbling decay had been repaired or tom down. Several
new buildings had sprung up in the vicinity of the plaza or the
forbidding mound that was Fort Marcy.
The plaza itself remained innocent of trees, an acequia carrying water along one side opposite the Governor's Palace; but the
level area between, when not crowded with wagons, milling
people, and assorted livestock, was bare, hard-packed dirt. Usually
it was dusty-a fine gritty dust that on windy days seeped through
the tightest doors and window casements. During the rainy season,
which now welcomed the 3d Regiment of Missouri Volunteers,
afternoon showers could tum the plaza into a rutty quagmire.
Large commissary trains rolled into town in the wake of the
troops, their almost daily arrival and unloading roiling the dust
and everywhere leaving small mountains of badly needed stores.
Where the Missourians with Kearny found one public house
offering indifferent lodging and worse food, there now were four:
the Santa Fe House, on the plaza's southeast comer; the Missouri
House and Billiard Saloon on the south side; Beck and Redmans
Hotel, and the German Hotel, both close by. Several boarding
houses offered accommodations, the proprietress of one, "Mrs. G.
of Habile's, recently arrived from New Orleans, La.," announcing
that she "would be pleased to receive a few more Gentlemen as
boarders, and flatters herself that her efforts to please will, as heretofore, succeed."4 The Santa Fe House, to be followed on the same
site by the Exchange Hotel and famed La Fonda, was opened in
early January by John C. Ronald, who promised a table "kept constantly set, and Breakfast, Dinner or Supper, can be had any hour
of the day or night. . . . Oysters, Sardines, &c., always on hand
and cooked if desired."5 One item missing from his menu, and
grievously missed by gringo patrons, was the common potato-still
unknown to New Mexicans.
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Gambling tables operated continuously but with relative decorum, only rarely provoking the passions, the knuckle-cracking
brawls and knifings that more and more often turned nightly fandangoes into free-for-alls between soldiers and native male citizens,
the fights almost always originating with too much aguardiente,
progressing to disputed claims upon the favors of a girl and ending
in outraged native pride. Presence of so many troops in so small a
town that offered so few diversions inevitably made it necessary to
curtail the fun, the town's not notably pious newspaper observing
that "We are happy to hear that there has been a stop put to so many
Fandangoes on a night-and particularly to those on the other side
of the Rio Chicito, as they invariably break up in a 'Row,' and
should they continue, would no doubt terminate in the death of
some persons before spring."6

Merchants of the town who advertised their wares were mainly
expatriate veterans of the Santa Fe trade, dependent on wholesalers
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in the States for their merchandise, and increasingly dependent on
military payrolls for their profits. New contingents of Missouri and
Illinois volunteers arriving in early September soon found their
way to the house of William S. McKnight, on the west side of the
plaza, who offered a "splendid assortment of Dry Goods, Hosiery,
Hardware, Queensware, Tin Ware, Boots, Hats, Caps and Stationery; Groceries of all kinds, Liquors, Wines, &c. . . . cheap
for cash." A few months later, in a building next to McKnight's,
the firm of St. Vrain & Bent opened in friendly competition with
the same lines displayed by McKnight as well as "Glassware,
Clothing, Sardines, Butter, Coffee, Bacon hams, Blankets, Hats,
Mackerel, Cheese . . . low for cash." Two doors east was the
store of Boggs, Kean &Boggs, no place to go for Hats and Mackerel
but excellent for Dry Goods-especially "very fine and superior
cloaks, all of which will be sold low for cash." St. Vrain and Bent
were not competitors for long; within one week of their opening
they sold their entire stock to Judge Joab Houghton, who proposed
to continue the business at the same location. 7
Americans in Santa Fe welcomed such listings of table delicacies and fine raiment, such civilized accommodations, no more for
their anticipated enjoyment than the comforting assurance of
progress toward remembered gracious living in the States. But the
prideful evidence was still illusory and transparent. The town was
yet essentially primitive, the vast plains and mesas and mountains
surrounding it beautiful to look upon, perhaps, but always subject
to savage vagaries, whether of harsh climate or human indifference to life. No notice was taken, therefore, of the appearance in
town of James Kirker, whose usual attire proclaimed more than a
little about his profession: a fringed buckskin shirt with leggings
to match, enormous spurs of Mexican metal on his boots, a
Hawkins rifle balanced on his arm, his dark face and long hair
silhouetted in shadow under the broad brim and high crown of a
Mexican sombrero. Little more notice was paid, a paragraph item
only, when Don Santiago let it be known he was opening, as proprietor, yet another hotel "in the lower part of town."8
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of this scene, whose lack of protective bark was
equaled by youth and candor, was Philip Ferguson, a printer's
apprentice in St. Louis when he enlisted in the 3d Missouri Regiment. An entry in his diary for September 2 is pertinent to our
subject:
ONE OBSERVER

The Santa Fe battalion started today on an expedition into the
Navajo country, these Indians having violated their treaty with
Colonel Doniphan by their robberies of the Mexicans. The three
companies composing this battalion are made up principally of reenlisted volunteers and are a very wild and reckless set. Nearly every
man left drunk!9

A jaunty informality seems to have characterized the expedition
generally. No official report of the campaign has been found and
it is probable that Major Robert Walker, commanding the battalion, made none. It was the first punitive expedition by a large
American force against the Navajo, but in the looseness of its
organization it bears some resemblance to earlier Mexican slaving
raids. The weekly Republican, ignoring the liquorish departure,
observed that since Doniphan's treaty of the previous November,
Navajo Indians on various occasions had "made incursions into
this Territory, killing many Mexicans and driving off large herds
of stock, a part of which belonged to Americans. There being now
a large force in and near this place, it is deemed necessary that
these outrages should no longer be tolerated and Maj. Walker,
with the Battalion of Volunteers . . . have left to invade the
country the second time and bring them to subjection. They left
with two months provisions, their search being through a country
exceedingly rough and broken.... All of these men are hardened
and inured to the service and are determined upon giving this set
of marauders a chastizing which they will not soon forget."lo
Walker's command probably included a number of Mexican
and Indian guides although no mention of them is made in the
Republican's story, which comments only that Walker's junior
officers were Captains Hamilton, Grove, and Armstrong, their
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mounted troops accompanied by a detachment of artillery from
Captain Hassendeubel's company, now serving with the 1st Dragoons at Taos.
Seven or eight days after its departure the battalion crossed the
Rio Grande below Albuquerque and marched nearly due west. At
the Ojo de la Jara, a familiar landmark on the old Spanish trail
between Acoma and Zuni, Major Walker left his wagons under
strong guard and proceeded with pack animals and ten days' provisions to the pueblo. From Zuni the command pressed northward
through forested hilly country to Cienega Amarilla, then past the
later site of Fort Defiance and on to Red Lake. From a base camp
here three detachments were sent out in different directions, Captain Grove's command returning on the second day and Captain
Hamilton's on the third. Both reported they had failed to find
either Navajo Indians or Navajo stock. A third party of fifteen
men under 2d Lieutenant Thomas H. Coats, scouting westward to
the head of Pueblo Colorado Wash, was surprised and fired upon
in close rocky terrain by some twenty Navajo warriors. Coats led
his men in a charge in which one N avajo was killed and several
were wounded. The other Navajo withdrew, leaving a number of
their horses to be captured or shot by the pursuing soldiers.
Upon the return of Lieutenant Coats, and discovering that his
provisions were exhausted, Major Walker marched toward Canyon
de Chelly, presumably on the advice of his guides and in the hope
of there capturing Navajo sheep or other supplies of food. His
command, now numbering about one hundred forty men, or
slightly less than half its full strength, reached the mouth of De
Chelly and penetrated the canyon six miles. The stillness of the
deep gorge, disturbed only by the sound of their mounted progress,
soon convinced the troops that further advance was futile-that
the Navajo long since had abandoned this place and taken their
livestock with them. Retracing their own tracks to the mouth of
the canyon they found that not quite all of the Indians had
vanished: On the rimrock high above, small figures against the
sky, a few were observed watching Walker's withdrawal and well
beyond range of his muskets.
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This much and only a bit more the major related when he returned with a small escort to Santa Fe for more supplies on October 14. The campaign had very nearly ended in disaster. Close to
starvation, his men had begun the long return march to Ojo de la
Jara where the wagons had been left. One by one, they killed and
ate their pack mules. When the last mule was gone they subsisted
on the meat of dogs-no game being found-and wild parsley.
Their acute distress finally was relieved by the arrival of a detachment that had been sent ahead to Zuni for provisions, which the
people of the pueblo offered generously. His battalion, Walker
said, was encamped in the Zuni Mountains awaiting his return. l l
Shortly thereafter, as winter closed in, the battalion was assigned
to duty at Socorro.
Indirectly-because Walker's battalion suffered more punishment than it inBicted-the campaign had one effect upon the
Navajo that, in other circumstances, might have been beneficial.
Several headmen came to Santa Fe late in November to ask for
another council of peace. Neither they nor the official with whom
they spoke are identified, although the latter may have been
Colonel Edward W. B. Newby, then commanding the 9th Military Department of New Mexico. Conditions for discussing peace
were not suitable, the Navajo were told; they were directed to
bring more of their principal men to Santa Fe, and also to bring
with them and turn over all captive prisoners and all livestock
taken by the tribe. No mention was made of a reciprocal surrender
of Navajo captives. The headmen departed, saying they would
comply with the proposals and return before the next full moon.
"We have no faith in their promise to do so," the Repuhlican
commented, "nor do we believe that a lasting peace can be made
until they have felt the full force and power of the Government.
. . . In the meantime we hope the Government at Washington
will take decided measures to have at least a Battalion sent into
their country early next spring to lay it waste and wage a war of
destruction." There is no evidence that a second Navajo delegation
returned. In the following January, however, another item in the
same paper observed that "This tribe of Indians has been very
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quiet during the last two or three months, or since the southern
part of this territory has been occupied by our troops."12 The
Navajo continued at peace until the next April, when raids on
New Mexican livestock were resumed.

COLONEL EDWARD W. B. NEWBY appears to have been a competent officer whose interrupted term of eleven months in command
of the 9th Military Department has generally been neglected by
historians or overlooked entirely. Bancroft mentions his name
twice and Twitchell, demoting him in rank to lieutenant colonel,
once. IS For three reasons at least he is deserving of better treatment.
He was, for one, the only 9th Department commander to complain
of having many more troops at his disposal than he needed. For
another, he was the first military officer to acknowledge and call
to the attention of superiors in Washington the often crippling
rivalry between civil and military branches of territorial authoritya rivalry that already found the military firmly seated in control.
Lastly, he led a campaign against the Navajo that resulted in a
second American treaty with the tribe which, like Doniphan's
treaty, was never ratified and was not much worse or better than
the treaties that preceded it.
At the river town of Alton, Illinois, a short distance above St.
Louis, Newby was mustered into service as commander of Company B, Illinois Volunteer Infantry, on June 8, 1847. Shortly
afterward he was elected colonel in command of the 1 st Illinois
Regiment and led advance detachments of that unit and the 3d
Missouri Volunteers across the plains, arriving in Santa Fe on
September II. As senior officer then in the territory, he relieved
Lieutenant Colonel Easton in command of the department three
days later. 14 He had scarcely had time to pay his respects to Governor Donaciano Vigil and find himself quarters when he was
beset by callers offering him daily briefings on "discontent and
insubordination" in the valley of Taos-these supposedly threatening to end in the murder of many Americans-and of the troublesome maraudings of Navajo and Apache. Newby received the
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reports calmly, and, after a few weeks in residence, with increasing
disbelief. Although he was not sure of the exact size of his command, because many of the troops had gone immediately to outlying grazing camps and not yet reported to him, he estimated the
force to number between 2,500 and 3,000 men. 15
"Every portion of this territory," he advised the adjutant general
early in October, "enjoys at this time perfect tranquillity, without
the slightest threatening of future internal disturbance; it consequently cannot fail to be perceived that the force now here is much
larger than is required. . . ." Reports from the south, however,
had persuaded him that in that direction lay a real danger. Manuel
Armijo was at El Paso gathering a large army with which he
presently would attempt to retake Santa Fe. To forestall this,
Newby would soon send reinforcements to follow three companies
of mounted troops he already had directed to El Paso with orders
to "take and hold the place . . . for the reason that by falling
upon the enemy the sooner, he will be less prepared for an attack
and can be more easily defeated. . . ." And because he believed
that "perhaps less than half the troops already here are all that are
required to hold permanent and tranquil possession of this territory," Newby urged that he be permitted to detach half of his
command for an expedition against northern provinces of Mexico
still occupied by enemy troops. Newby felt that President Polk
should be informed of "the urgent necessity as well as the very
anxious desire of the different authorities" to define what General
Kearny had left cloudily uncertain: the line of demarcation between the proper functions of civil and military officers. Colonel
Price (now by a recent promotion Brigadier General) had left
nothing in print or writing to instruct him, Newby said, with the
result that:
In almost every particular do these difficulties arise-but most frequently in matters of jurisdiction over crimes and misdemeanors, the
'military, doubting the extent of its power to punish crime, while at
the same time it is reluctant to recognise the authority of a civil government which . . . has of late lost much' of its integrity . . . from
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conflict with & natural preponderance of the Military, but which .••
watches with a jealous eye, and is ready to question almost every act
of the other. Ill

Officialdom in distant Washington, always moving with glacial
composure in such matters, still had taken no notice of the problem
when General Price returned to Santa Fe. Here, before proceeding
south in hope of engaging the forces of General Urrea, he resumed command for a short time-but time enough for him to
widen the breach between the two departments of government.
Duties and even several offices nominally a part of civil government
were arrogated to the military under terms of orders Price signed
and had publicly posted on February 5, 1848. Offices of the territorial secretary, the United States attorney, and United States
marshal were abolished. A six per cent tax, payable by the town's
storekeepers, was imposed upon all but a few imported items of
merchandise. The territorial treasurer was appointed collector of
the new tax, with authority to exact bonds from merchants for the
taxable value of any merchandise they imported, and to determine
and report any suspected act of fraud by the importers.
Gambling, which always had been almost a natural part of
Santa Fe life, henceforth would be prohibited to all but a few by a
confiscatory tax. Owners of gambling establishments were required
to obtain a license every three months, each time paying a tax of
.five hundred dollars, the two thousand dollars annual levy being
high enough to drive all but a few gambling houses out of business.
Another term of the same clause prohibited soldiers, excepting
officers, and citizens under the age of twenty-one from gambling
at all. Enforcement was divided between the city police and the
Provost Guard, who were to be allowed unhindered inspection of
gambling establishments at all times. Proprietors who failed to
observe the law would be subject to loss of their license and a one
hundred dollar fine. The smaller gambling fry were to be arrested
and their cases heard "in a summary manner," the unlicensed
owner of a gambling house to be fined fifty dollars and each of the
participants in a game, twenty-five dollars. These regulations, the
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order declared, "as well as all others, which have been issued by
the Commanding General, relative to the civil government of New
Mexico, are to be deemed permanent, and will not be altered
except by authority of these, or higher Head Quarters."17
Martial law had not been imposed in New Mexico, but it was
still wartime and Santa Fe could be defined as an occupied enemy
town. The lines were blurred, although Price himself was confident that the territory would remain tranquil under the protection
of a moderate force-Colonel Newby's Illinois Infantry, for example, and three companies of Missouri Mounted Volunteers. In
justification of his arbitrary seizure of civil authority Price advanced one excuse: Annual expenses of the territory currently
amounted to about $10,000, and at present there was an arrearage
of some $9,000. The six per cent tax he imposed upon imports, _
which he estimated in the present year would amount to $300,000,
should return enough revenue to payoff all debts and the year's
expenses. In Price's view, undoubtedly, all was neat and tidy. To
the merchants and gamblers Price was a profane word, but in
another and longer view, his action was the prelude to a painful,
often damaging, and long continuing period of military rule during
which the groping efforts of the territory toward effectual civil
government were frustrated or held in contempt.
At Socorro, meanwhile, Major Walker's Santa Fe Battalion prepared to return to garrison the chastened capital upon General
Price's departure for Chihuahua. Navajo Indians had been seen in
the Rio Abajo, but for several months had given no cause for
alarm. Instead, it was the raider Manuel Cortes who had stirred a
part of Walker's command to action. Captain Armstrong had been
sent with forty men to Anton Chico where Cortes was said to be
roaming the region and inciting rebellion. Several days later, in a
canyon somewhere to the south and west of there, a minor engagement was fought. Several Mexicans were seento fall, but not until
the following morning was the ground examined and only bloodstains were found. Armstrong, whose force had been greatly reduced by sickness-the official version-although wine and wenching at Anton Chico may have been closer .to the truth, took no
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casualties. Immediately after the fight at the canyon he had withdrawn to the camp lately left in haste by Cortes and there found,
and burned, thirty saddles and bridles and various articles of
clothing. More important, papers were recovered that contained
detailed instructions by the war office at Mexico City for the
organization of units of Mexican volunteers to operate against the
American invaders. Among the papers was an order signed by
Governor Trias of Chihuahua commissioning Cortes as a captain
in the Mexican service. Its discovery put the raider in a new light.
Henceforth, instead of "outlaw" and "robber," he would be referred to as "the Guerrilla Chief CorteS."18
COLONEL NEWBY'S resumption of command in February may
have been welcomed by citizens glad to see Price go; unfortunately,
at the same time, it had. the effect of dropping a curtain upon
military operations in the territory during the balance of winter
and early months of spring. Newby was not a professional soldier
and so was not accustomed to the punctilious filing of reports.
Only indirectly, by his oblique reference at a later date, therefore,
is any light shed on the cause of renewed Navajo raids that spring.
Probably in March or early April-Newby is vague on the point"the Mexicans had succeeded . . . in taking from the [Navajo]
by stealth, immense numbers of cattle and sheep, leaving the
Indians with about as much as properly belongs to them."19 He
does not say so, but it is safe to assume that the Navajo retaliated
against the Mexicans with such force that Newby felt impelled to
lead a punitive expedition against their traditional stronghold,
once known to Spaniards as Casafuerte. He would go with no
thought of making peace, the Republican observed incorrectly,
"but to give them a good flogging which they richly deserve for
their many depredations."2o
The command which started from Santa Fe on May I was composed of one hundred fifty men of the 3d Missouri Mounted
Volunteers and fifty Illinois infantry who also, for this occasion,
were mounted. Newby proceeded to Jemez, where he obtained
guides, and from there on May 4 continued in a northwesterly
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direction, "an arduous march of six days, through a country of
deep sand and almost entirely destitute of water and vegitation."
Late on the sixth day, and now in the broad plain of the upper
Chusca Valley, the column came upon four or five Navajo horsemen moving leisurely and not far in advance. Newby ordered a
detachment of men on the best horses to overtake and seize the
Indians, but "soon perceived . . . from the extreme ease with
which the Indians made their escape, that an attempt to march
openly upon them would be folly. . . . The difference between
the speed of their animals and ours infinitely surpassed my expectations. . . ." Camp was made at the base of Beautiful Mountain,
referred to by Newby as Monte del Cayatana, and which he described as "extremely rugged, . . . the strongest possible barrier
to the country of the Navijos." The immediate presence of those
Indians, and in large numbers, was made known to the troops
almost at once when clouds of dust rising in the near distance indicated the Navajo were gathering immense herds of their livestock,
mainly sheep, and driving them westward to the mountain foothills and into a pass across the mountains.
Although it was now evening, enough daylight remained to
make Newby believe a determined pursuit could be successful.
He accordingly directed Captain David D. Stockton of the Missouri Volunteers to take fifty men and follow the Navajo's trail
with all possible speed, emphasizing that Stockton was "not to halt
until he had overtaken them."21 Others who heard the orders given
remembered them as even more emphatic and specific: The captain
was instructed to pursue the Navajo "night and day until they
overtook them-to secure their stock, and scour the country."
Leaving the main body of troops probably in the vicinity of present Sa-nos-tee, Captain Stockton appears to have followed Pena
Blanca Creek on its course through the boulder-strewn and gradually ascending approach to the pass. Here, having proceeded some
five miles, he gave the order to halt and make camp. How faithfully
he had carried out his instructions is open to question. There is evidence that many Navajo were observed nearby and therefore a
case might be made that he at least had "overtaken" them. There

188

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW XLIII: 3 1968

is evidence also, regardless of what Colonel Newby had told him,
that Stockton wished to avoid trouble.
At daylight the next morning Stockton's men awoke to find
Navajo both to the right and left of them driving hundreds of
sheep toward the pass, but to their astonishment, "the Captain
instead of attacking them as he should have done, according to
orders, permitted them to escape with [the] stock." One of the
Missourians, a private named Green, observed the captain's inertia
with puzzled surprise. When a few of the volunteers, acting on
their own initiative, set out in pursuit and soon brought back
eleven Navajo prisoners, all well armed and mounted, Green
"went to Capt. Stockton and asked his permission to take ten men
[to] secure the stock that the Indians were driving off, but the
Captain refused . . . and refused to go himself, saying that the
Indians would soon 'bring in the stock,' and surrender to them."22
Stockton, who appears to have lapsed into a paralysis of fear, did
manage to send an express back to Newby informing the colonel
of his situation.
Newby at once mounted hjs command and proceeded to Stockton's camp. Here he found only four or five of the Navajo captured earlier, the others having been allowed to ride off without
effort to stop them. "I was astonished to find," Newby later reported, "that the Prisoners were mounted, well armed, and running at large through the encampment. I was still further surprised
to find that there was a number of Indians jn the hills around at a
very short distance from the command, and that the men were
scattered around, the greater number of them without their
guns."23
Perhaps less to his surprise, this informal scene was transformed
a moment later when Newby ordered the remaining prisoners disarmed and dismounted. As hands reached out to seize their
weapons, the Navajo wheeled their horses in flight, at the same
time opening a fire of arrows and musket balls that was augmented
by a fusillade directed on the camp from all sides by their companions in the hills. Forty or fifty rounds were expended by the
troops from such cover as could be found before the Indians with-
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drew. Several of their men were wounded and four were left dead.
A pursuit was organized with such effect that Newby presently
called a halt "for the purpose of disencumbering myself of the
greater part of the prisoners," but how many of them there were he
does not say. His report then appears to telescope the remaining
events of that day and the next into one. Another version, appearing soon afterward in the Repuhlican, is probably more accurate:
The next morning Col. Newby proceeded o~ with his command,
having sent out scouting parties, and met two or three of the chiefs
coming in to make peace, he told them he did not want peace, but
wanted to fight them-he also told them that he would give them
three days to bring in their people, and if they would then make peace
to his satisfaction, he would then enter into a treaty with them. 24
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Newby waited nine days in camp at Beautiful Mountain for
the peace delegation to come in and then, on May 20, signed a
treaty with Jose Largo, Narbcma, Zarcillos Largos, and five other
headmen. 25 No account of the proceedings, other than a treaty
copy, has been found. A possible division of feeling among the
Navajo over making peace with the Bilagaana is suggested by the
absence of Cayetano, whose home this region was and who also
had failed to sign Doniphan's treaty. If, indeed, there was illfeeling on Cayetano's part in the past, there may have been understandable cause now, for the four Navajo who were killed by
Newby's command in all probability were members of Cayetano's
band. From his viewpoint, furthermore, the seizure. of Navajo
prisoners and killing and wounding of others was unprovoked-a
retaliation for Navajo raids on enemy Mexicans in a continuing
war which, to many Navajo minds, was none of the Americans'
business. While this is conjectural, there is reason to believe that
the Navajo who signed the treaty did so in good faith and in a
sincere wish to live at peace with the new government at Santa Fe.
The treaty opened with a declaration of "firm and lasting peace"
between the Navajo and the people of the United States and
people of New Mexico "during its occupation. by the United
States," the last phrase repeated twice again and suggesting that,
in Colonel Newby's mind at least, the Americans' stay in New
Mexico might be of limited duration. The second article repeated
a familiar Spanish and Mexican treaty term guaranteeing mutual
trade and free access of both sides to country occupied by the
other. An important provision of the Doniphan treaty was given
even greater emphasis in the third article, which declared that:
There shall be an entire restoration of all prisoners, that are held
at. the date of this treaty by either of the parties, and the people of
New Mexico; such restoration to be full and complete without regard
to the number of prisoners held.

Newby assured the Navajo in the fourth article that "The people
of the United States guarantee dureing their occupation of New
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Mexico, the strict observance of this treaty by the people of the
Territory." Newby's motive was sound, but it was an unfortunate
clause. He was able to fulfill his promise only in part. A mutual
exchange of some captives was arranged, but in a matter of weeks a
company of New Mexicans was raiding again in Navajo country.
The fifth and last article omitted the usual demand for restoration
of all livestock taken by Navajo, possibly because, as Newby
observed, Mexicans just prior to his campaign had taken "immense
herds" of sheep and cattle from the tribe, but did require the
Navajo to surrender three hundred sheep and one hundred mules
and horses "as indemnity in full for the expences incured by the
people of the United States in this Campaign."
On June 17, following his return to Santa Fe, Colonel Newby
reported the Navajo had fully complied with their part of the
agreement, having delivered the stipulated number of animals
and surrendered twelve Mexican captives. He may have overstated
the case, for the Republican observed that on the evening of July 5
a delegation of Navajo appeared in the capital, bringing with them
"a large herd of horses, from which our Quarter Master selected
some fifty head, which completed the number they were to give to
our government. They also brought in some two or three more captives. . . ." More captives still would have been surrendered, the
Republican continued, "had it not been for a Mexican expidition
which has been out against them, and drove a large party of
Navijos from the country, or to such a distance that they were
. "
not able to come Ill.
,
If the New Mexicans violated the treaty in this important
respect, they did consent to an equal exchange of captives, and for
the Navajo it was an emotional reunion. The writer of the Republican story noted that "The Navijos manifested great parental
affection on meeting with their children and wives, which had
been taken as prisoners by the Mexicans. We have every reason
now to believe that . . . all hostilities will cease unless the Mexicans are the first to transgress."26
Larger events in distant places made their inevitable imprint.
The war with Mexico came to an end in the spring of 1 848, bring-
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ing the locally unpopular General Price back to Santa Fe where
he arrived with his staff on August 4. Within the week orders
were issued by Price directing Colonel Newby to concentrate his
regiment at Las Vegas, preparatory to returning to Alton and
being mustered out. Troops of the 3d Missouri regiment, equally
fortunate, were gathered in camp at Taos late in August; they
would depart for home within a few days. Lieutenant Alpheus
Wheeler, their acting quartermaster, was in town arranging for
wagons and teams for the eastward journey over the Santa Fe
Trail when the Republican reported, on August 24, that "a large
party of Navijos came in the other day with more captives, and
delivered them over" to Governor Donaciano Vigil. If a similar
number of Navajo captives were surrendered by Mexicans on
this occasion, the Republican did not mention it.
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